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Over the past decade and a half, a great deal of attention has right-
fully been given to the issue of wrongful convictions. In 2003, Jim Dwyer,
Peter Neufeld and Barry Scheck published Actual Innocence, an eye-
opening treatise on the reality of wrongful convictions in the United
States.1 In the years since, more than 1400 innocent persons have been
exonerated, and a very diverse research community of attorneys, aca-
demics, social scientists, and activists has developed in response to the
realization offlaws in our criminal justice system. In 2012, Brandon Gar-
rett's Convicting the Innocent quantitatively evaluated the first 250 DNA
exonerations and exposed clear patterns of error within those cases.2
Dan Simon's In Doubt: The Psychology of the Criminal justice Process
followed with a union of these patterns and their relationship with estab-
lished psychological principles.3 This strong foundation has led to an
explosion of interest in identifying, analyzing and resolving the issues
raised in wrongful conviction cases.4
The Innocence Project, founded in 1992 by Scheck and Neufeld in
cooperation with the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, has expanded
to many dozens of Innocence Network organizations throughout the
world. The Duke Wrongful Convictions Clinic, in operation for just over
five years, recently marked its fifth exoneration in the state of North Car-
olina. In addition, the Clinic is currently working seven innocence peti-
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tions filed and in litigation, and additional cases are in various stages of
investigation.
In an effort to better understand and remedy the errors occurring in
these wrongful conviction cases, the Duke Clinic's research team is work-
ing to develop a root cause analysis methodology intended to identify the
policies, procedures, and legal doctrines that contribute to these errors
and to develop strategies for improving the criminal justice process. Be-
cause the justice system relies on individuals and the decisions they make
as the core of its function, it is necessary to consider the various roles of
responsibility and evaluate their decision-making processes in order to
identify the root causes of wrongful outcomes. Here, we illustrate this
process with a consideration of the jury's role in reaching wrongful ver-
dicts.
INTRODUCTION
The jury trial plays a critical constitutional and institutional role in
American jurisprudence. Jury service is, technically, the only constitu-
tional requirement demanded of our citizens and, as such, places an
important responsibility on those chosen to serve on any jury, espe-
cially within the criminal justice system. jury research has established
that, generally, jurors take their responsibilities seriously; they work
with the evidence presented at trial and they reach verdicts that corre-
late to the narratives they develop throughout the trial.5 But with esti-
mates of wrongful conviction rates as high as 5% in serious felony
cases,6 how are juries getting it wrong? Synthesizing what we know
about how juries operate with what is seen again and again in wrong-
ful conviction cases, the answer seems clear-the established eviden-
tiary doctrines are sometimes compelling incorrect verdicts by
presenting the juries with incomplete and inaccurate evidence while
expecting them to develop complete and accurate narratives. Inevita-
bly, this dichotomy leads to verdicts that are sometimes based on mis-
leading narratives... surely not the ideal intended for our system's lay
participants.
In this article, we consider the interaction of evidentiary issues
and jury performance in light of the problem of wrongful convictions.
S. Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The Story
Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519, 542 (1991).
6. Samuel R. Gross, How Many False Convictions Are There? How Many Exonerations Are
There? (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 316,
2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2225420.
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We start with a quick review of the jury's role in the American justice
system and the widely accepted story model approach to jury decision-
making. We next discuss the legal standards of evidence and admissi-
bility issues at trial and how problems with withheld, misleading, or
erroneously excluded or included evidence can affect the narrative a
jury creates, and thus the verdict that jury renders, and consider how
these issues are handled on appeal and in post-conviction litigation.
To demonstrate the impact of these problems, we examine two
completely different case scenarios that illustrate how these evidence
issues impact jurors' options for narrative development. The case of
LaMonte Armstrong, an exoneration facilitated by the Duke Wrongful
Convictions Clinic, exemplifies injustices that can result from prosecu-
torial errors and misconduct. The second case, drawn from the pub-
lished perspective of an actual juror, displays how arguably faulty
narratives can result from improper application of evidentiary and
exclusionary rules. Finally, we contemplate how to address these is-
sues in terms of policy and practice, and the avenues for further exam-
ination of these evidentiary issues.
I. DYNAMICS OF JURY DECISION-MAKING
The role of the jury as trier of fact is perhaps one of the most criti-
cal notions in the American justice system. The Sixth Amendment
guarantees the right to a public trial by an impartial jury of one's
peers,7 and while each side has some opportunity to shape the jury
makeup through challenges for cause and peremptory challenges,
there are clear limitations on obviously discriminatory challenges, at
least in the areas of race and gender.8 The resulting jury is intended to
be representative of the community and a group capable of evaluating
the evidence presented, joined with the parameters of the law offered
by the judge, to determine the facts of the case.
On its face, the concept is sound: with a legal expert at hand, a
group of six to twelve citizens should be able to weigh and evaluate the
information presented during trial into a coherent and logical result.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
8. .E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (prohibiting gender-based challenges);
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (prohibiting race-based challenges). However, despite
Batson, research bearing on North Carolina's Racial Justice Act has demonstrated consistent
patterns of excluding minority members in death penalty cases. See Neil Vidmar, The North Caro-
lina RacialJustice Act: An Essay on Substantive and Procedural Fairness in Death Penalty Litigation,
97 IowA L. REV. 1969 (2012).
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With the added benefit of deliberations providing an opportunity for
the jurors to discuss the ins and outs of the evidence and the law, it is
rationally plausible to assume that the jury is a legitimate arbiter of
justice within its defined role as the trier of fact. Although there is fre-
quent criticism of the institution, significant research has established
that juries are generally fair, efficient, and effective.9
Rita Simon's early research concluded that jurors' decision-
making processes are similar to those of a court judge: they take their
responsibilities seriously, work to keep the law (as they understand it)
in mind, and seek consistency within the evidence they have to work
with.10 Jurors actively process the presented evidence; make infer-
ences; and use common sense, societal norms and personal experienc-
es to inform their opinions." Jury decisions appear to track the
position of the median juror in the group rather than leaning to ex-
tremism, even if it is present within the jury.12 Essentially, research has
established the average juror as an effective decision-maker who
works hard to understand and fulfill his duties as expected.13
Subsequent empirical research has established that jurors tend to
follow a clear process in reaching a final verdict. Reid Hastie, Steven D.
Penrod, and Nancy Pennington identified an approach to juror deci-
sion-making called the story model, in which jurors construct a story
that embraces the facts presented, as well as their own knowledge and
experience, into a coherent whole.14 This widely accepted theory pre-
sumes that the jurors construct explanations for the evidence as it is
presented by incorporating their own knowledge about the offense,
their new knowledge gained through trial evidence, and their own ex-
pectations of what constitutes a complete story.1s In this model, the
story construction is a dynamic process, culminating in each individu-
9. NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE VERDICT (2007).
10. RITA J. SIMON, THE JURY: ITS ROLE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY (1980).
11. Id
12. Id.; see also Shamena Anwar, Patrick Bayer & Randi Hjalmarsson, The Impact ofJury Race
in Trials 24-25 (Econ. Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) Working Papers Series, Paper No. 55,
2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1673994.
13. SIMON, supra note 10.
14. REID HASTIE, STEVEN D. PENROD & NANCY PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY (1983); Nancy Pen-
nington & Reid Hastie, The Story Model for Juror Decision Making, in INSIDE THE JUROR: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAKING 192-221 (Reid Hastie ed., 1993); Steven Penrod & Reid
Hastie, Models of Jury Decision Making: A Critical Review, 86 PSYCHOL. BULL. 462,462-492 (1979).
15. Pennington & Hastie, supra note 14.
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al's verdict position. Because individual knowledge, experience, and
expectations vary, the story construction for each juror can also vary.16
In one of their early studies, Pennington and Hastie asked jurors
to discuss aloud their story construction and discovered that the jurors
often included evidence they inferred (rather than was actually pre-
sented) to complete their narratives.17 The stories constructed by
those leaning toward not guilty verdicts differed significantly from
those leaning toward guilty verdicts, even though all heard the same
evidence.18 In a 1988 follow-up study, these same researchers found
that jurors tended to recognize more pieces of evidence that fit their
ultimate decision and fewer that contradicted that decision.19 In a third
study, Pennington and Hastie found that when the prosecution pre-
sented its case in a story-telling format and the defense did not, the
jurors convicted 78% of the time.20 When the approaches were re-
versed, the conviction rate dropped to just 31%.21
Jurors can and do create many competing explanations of the
events presented at trial. Within the story model, jurors typically use
three criteria in developing the most acceptable narrative: coverage,
coherence, and uniqueness.22 Coverage refers to how much of the pre-
sented evidence a developed narrative can accommodate.23 Coherence
refers to the narrative's degree of plausibility, internal consistency, and
completeness.24 If a juror's developed narrative is coherent, offers a
sense of completeness, and accounts for all the evidence presented at
trial, the juror can feel confident in his or her narrative. If more than
one version of the story is coherent and covers all the facts provided,
jurors will have less confidence in their decision-making. That is, when
more than one interpretation can fit the provided fact pattern, some
tension can develop over which explanation to accept.
16. Id.
17. Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Juror Decision-Making Models: The Generalization Gap,
89 PSYCHOL. BULL. 246, 279 (1981).
18. Id.
19. Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Explanation-Based Decision-Making: Effects of Memory
Structure on Judgment, 14 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: LEARNING, MEMORY & COGNITION, 521, 524
(1988).
20. Id at 529.
21. Id.
22. HASTIE, PENROD & PENNINGTON, supra note 14. Hastie, Penrod and Pennington developed
this concept in the early 1980s, but this reference provides the best explanation, from which this
paragraph description is drawn.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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Once all the evidence is in and jurors have created their narra-
tives, they are provided instructions and legal definitions on which to
base their verdict. From there, jurors will choose the verdict that best
matches their individually constructed story. Pennington and Hastie
demonstrated that when the evidence was presented in a way that
made it easier for participants to create a story, the participants were
more likely to vote in accordance with the preponderance of the evi-
dence.25 The story model has been effective in describing jury decision-
making in a wide range of cases, including murder, rape, and sexual
harassment cases.26
Further studies bearing on the story model have confirmed that
jurors who have an easy time constructing a coherent narrative are
very likely to deliver a verdict consistent with that story.27 Also, it ap-
pears that jurors' individual knowledge, experiences, and expectations
have a significant impact on their decisions, clarifying how and why
jurors reach different conclusions given the same presented evi-
dence.28
Given all that is known about how jurors operate in terms of syn-
thesizing evidence into a coherent narrative, and given that individual
jurors can create different narratives even when provided identical
data, it seems even more critical that the details introduced at trial be
complete and accurate. Unfortunately, it seems that, at least in situa-
tions of wrongful conviction, this is rarely the case.
II. EVIDENCE ISSUES IN WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
Given the jury's duty to be trier of fact, it would seem logically
beneficial for those jurors to be provided with a complete set of facts
with which to develop an accurate narrative of the particular situation.
In reality, that all too often is not the case. A number of exonerations
have shown astonishingly consistent problems with withheld, sup-
pressed, and misleading evidence, the vast majority of which were not
25. Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Explaining the Evidence: Tests of the Story Model for
Juror Decision Making, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 189, 189-206 (1992).
26. Id.; Jill E. Huntley & Mark Costanzo, Sexual Harassment Stories: Testing a Story-Mediated
Model ofJuror Decision-Making in Civil Litigation, 27 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 29, 29-51 (2003); Lynda
Olsen-Fulero & Solomon M. Fulero, Commonsense Rape Judgments: An Empathy-Complexity Theory
of Rapejuror Story Making, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 402, 402-27 (1997).
27. Ryan J. Winter & Edith Greene, Cognition and Juror Decision Making, in HANDBOOK OF
APPLIED COGNITION 743 (Francis Durso ed., 2d ed. 2007).
28. Vicki L. Sm;,h, When Prior Knowledge and Law Collide: Helping Jurors Use the Law, 17
LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 507 (1993).
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seriously considered on direct appeal.29 In addition, historically there
have been admissibility issues (e.g., prejudicial and irrelevant evidence
allowed into the trial or important and relevant evidence excluded)
that were also rubber stamped on appeal. In either situation, the jury is
left with an incomplete or misleading set of facts that require them to
apply their own experiences and beliefs to complete the narrative and
render a verdict.
A. Brady and Napue Issues
The evidentiary issues identified in most wrongful conviction cas-
es fall into one of two categories-evidence withheld from the defense
and jury or the presentation of false evidence. Withheld evidence is-
sues are typically considered Brady claims or some derivation thereof.
In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court ruled that prosecutors with-
holding evidence favorable to the defendant violates due process.30
The motivating force behind the Court's decision in Brady was the be-
lief that "[s]ociety wins not only when the guilty are convicted but
when criminal trials are fair; our system of the administration of jus-
tice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly."31
Thus, while many actors within the criminal justice system behave
as though Brady issues are merely a technicality, in fact they are a fun-
damental "rule of fairness."32 The totality of Brady and its progeny is
reasonably clear: the prosecution has a "duty to learn of"33 and disclose
to the defense all favorable material information known to the prose-
cution team, including the police.34 In United States v. Bagley,35 the
Court pointed out that the Brady rule signaled a slight departure from
a purely, adversarial system in that the prosecution team is essentially
29. NAT'L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, A PROJECT OF THE U. OF MICH. L. SCH.,
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/browse.aspx?View={B8342AE7-6520-
4A32-8A06-
4B326208BAF8}&FilterFieldl=Contributing xOO20_Factors x0020&FilterValue 1=False%20or%2
0Misleading%20Forensic%20Evidence (last visited May 7, 2015). Typically, exonerations are
successful with the cooperation of the current district attorney, or are based on irrefutable evi-
dence of innocence. Thus, the plethora of issues that actually caused the wrongful conviction are
not dealt with in the sense of legal precedent
30. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,90-91 (1963).
31. Id. at 87.
32. Curry v. United States, 658 A.2d 193, 197 (D.C. 1995).
33. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995).
34. Id. at 432; Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
35. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
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obligated to help the defense make its case.36 However, given the
plethora of resources at the state's disposal, including the police force
and forensics labs, Brady is intended to level the playing field.
While most Brady violations involve the failure to turn over favor-
able evidence at all, the failure to disclose evidence in a timely manner
can be a substantial problem as well, also leading to distorted evidence
at trial. The two types of evidence included under Brady and its proge-
ny are exculpatory and impeachment,37 and a delay in receiving either
type can put a significant damper on the defense's ability to develop a
legitimate case. In addition, while most discussions of Brady use the
term evidence, which implies evidence admissible at trial, the reality is
that the prosecution is required to turn over all information that might
"allow defense counsel an opportunity to investigate the facts of the
case and, with the help of the defendant, craft an appropriate de-
fense."38 During the time of investigation and strategy development,
admissibility at trial is a non-issue. That is, the admissibility of evi-
dence is an issue to be considered at trial, not an evaluation for the
prosecution to make during the investigative and pre-trial stages.
Therefore, any and all information relating to the case should be
turned over to the defense, even if it might be excluded at trial.
Some critics argue that there appears to be an attitude among
some prosecution teams that impeachment evidence is somehow less
constitutionally important than exculpatory evidence39 but in fact, im-
peachment evidence might be the bigger issue. For instance, over 50%
of known exonerations include perjury or false testimony, most of
which likely included witness incentives, delayed prosecution of
crimes, or other questionable motivations and the details of which the
prosecution had a duty to be aware of and share with the defense.40
Technically, the Brady doctrine dictates action at the appellate
level, rather than directly at trial. That is, Brady and its progeny pro-
vide an opportunity for errors to be corrected on direct appeal rather
than establishing clear requirements for pre-trial disclosure. This dis-
tinction is important because relief based on these errors depends
upon a hindsight perspective on the case. The three-step standard for a
36. Id.at675n.6.
37. See id. at 676; Kyles, 514 U.S. at 439; see generally Brady, 373 U.S. 83; Napue v. Illinois,
360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959).
38. Miller v. United States, 14 A.3d 1094, 1108 (D.C. 2011).
39. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999).
40. NAT'L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, A PROJECT OF THE U. OF MICH. L. SCH., supra note 29.
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legitimate Brady violation is that the undisclosed evidence be favorable
to the defense (either for exculpatory or impeachment purposes); the
evidence was suppressed by the state (intentionally or not); and that
"prejudice ensued."41 That is, that there exists a reasonable probability
that a different verdict would have been reached.
Most often Brady claims are denied because, although an error is
identified, the court rules that it is harmless error; in other words, that
its disclosure would not have impacted the outcome of the trial. In
Strickler v. Greene, Justice Stevens noted that "strictly speaking, there is
never a real 'Brady violation"' unless the issue of materiality is estab-
lished.42 Interestingly, the materiality test that Justice Stevens referred
to-"a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been differ-
ent"-is precisely the test for establishing prejudice under the federal
habeas "cause and prejudice" standard,43 a nearly impossible prospect.
Thus, with the added benefit of both hindsight and confirmation biases
firmly in hand, it is rare that Brady claims are accepted within the ap-
peals or habeas routes.
In United States v. Agurs, the Court defined three different stand-
ards of review in Brady issues.44 The highest level of scrutiny is to be
reserved for cases involving known perjury or false evidence, such that
reversal is warranted "if there is any reasonable likelihood that the
false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury."45 Second,
in cases where a specific Brady request is made, an intermediate level
of scrutiny is applied, such that failing to disclose specifically requested
evidence is "seldom, if ever, excusable."46 In all other cases, although
the prosecutor still maintains an independent disclosure obligation,
the Court will apply a less stringent standard: whether there is any
reasonable doubt about the conviction due to the suppressed evi-
dence.47
The reason for these varying standards of review is based on the
struggle to balance fairness in the form of full disclosure by the prose-
cution team and the impracticality of re-trying every case that includes
a Brady-type violation. In Agurs, the Court did recognize that the re-
41. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281-82.
42. Id.
43. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 730, 750 (1991).
44. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 98 (1976).
45. Id. at 103.
46. Id. at 106.
47. Id. at 106-07.
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viewing judge must set aside the verdict and judgment unless his "con-
viction is sure that the error did not influence the jury, or had but very
slight effect."48 In practice, however, appeals courts have tended to err
on the side of the prosecution, possibly based on a desire to support
the system itself or perhaps due to the confirmation bias effect of re-
viewing a case with a guilty verdict. Regardless, the result is a low
probability of overturning a case based on Brady and similar viola-
tions.
The second most common evidentiary error in wrongful convic-
tions involves the presentation of false, misleading, or inaccurate tes-
timony.49 In Napue v. Illinois, the Court established that the
presentation of false evidence by the state is a clear violation of due
process.s0 When that false evidence is testimonial in nature, it is not
necessary for that testimony to be perjury.s1 Rather, due process is
violated when the testimony is misleading or creates a false impres-
sion.s2
Napue claims essentially mirror Brady claims, in that the standard
for success is based on three factors: the testimony was actually false,
the prosecution knew or should have known that the testimony or
evidence was false, and, like Brady, the testimony or evidence was ma-
terial.53 Napue also included the point that the same result occurs
when the state allows such testimony or evidence to go uncorrected.54
In much the same manner as Brady issues, Napue issues change the
input for jurors, and thus inexorably alter the narratives developed
during trial and deliberations. Also like Brady issues, Napue claims are
typically dismissed under the "harmless error" doctrine.
Although one might expect evidentiary violations to be the sup-
pression or false presentation of some Perry Mason-type of heart-
stopping evidence, the reality is that most violations are viewed as
seemingly minor, or harmless, especially in the context of an already
tried and convicted defendant in an environment where the "finality"
of the justice system is held in high esteem. As it turns out, often those
"harmless" details, once fleshed out, turn out to be Perry Mason-esque
48. Id. at 112.
49. NAT'L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, A PROJECT OF THE U. OF MICH. L. SCH., supra note 29.
50. Napue, 360 U.S. at 269.
51. Id.
52. Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 32 (1957).
53. Sivak v. Hardison, 658 F.3d 898, 908-09 (9th Cir. 2011).
54. Napue, 360 U.S. at 269.
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and have proven to be shocking revelations of innocence in case after
case, often in those cases where relief was denied on direct appeal due
to "harmless error."
B. Admissibility Issues
While Brady and its progeny cover evidentiary errors that develop
directly from the state's actions, absent or misleading evidence can
also invade a trial through judicial decisions on admissibility, further
impacting the information available to the jury. The admissibility of
evidence is governed by the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) passed as
statutory laws in 1975,ss as well as court-created doctrines such as the
Exclusionary Rule.56 The rules of evidence developed prior to the FRE
tended to reflect a marked distrust of jurors, and the FRE were thus
designed to encourage the admission of evidence in borderline situa-
tions, entrusting the jury to correctly and justly evaluate information
for itself.57
The general rule in evidence, as laid out in the FRE, is that all rele-
vant evidence is admissible and all irrelevant evidence is inadmissible.
FRE 401 specifically states that "evidence is relevant if it has any ten-
dency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without
the evidence and the fact is of consequence in determining the ac-
tion."58 Rule 403 allows relevant evidence to be excluded "if its proba-
tive value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice," or if it is misleading, leads to confusion, or is a waste of
time.s9
Of course, like everything in law, it is never quite that simple.
There are three basic factors courts consider in evaluating whether
evidence is admissible-relevance, materiality, and competency.60 Rel-
evancy requires that the evidence have a tendency to prove or dis-
prove some important fact in the case. It is not necessary for the
information to absolutely prove the fact, just that it increases or de-
55. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1929. For further legislative history of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, see 1975 FRE Original Enactment Legislative History Page, FED.
EVIDENCE REV., http://federalevidence.com/node/574 (last visited May 7, 2015).
56. Dallin H. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 665,
665-757 (1970).
57. See generally FED. R. EVID.
58. FED. R. EVID. 401.
59. FED. R. EVID. 403.
60. FED. R. EvID. 402.
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creases the likelihood that the fact is true.61 Materiality requires that
the evidence relate to a particular fact in the case.62 Competent evi-
dence must be reliable in its form and presentation.63 Typically, this
issue is raised relative to witness statements, though it can pertain to
other types of evidence as well.64 Admissibility is, on its face, a reason-
ably straightforward issue.
Evidence inadmissibility, on the other hand, is a more complicat-
ed, nuanced area of law. The rules are driven by public policy interests,
case law, and the rules reflected in the FRE, but every rule has excep-
tions, and often those exceptions have exceptions in turn. Most of the
standards appear to be straightforward, but in practice are very sub-
jective and prone to bias influences in the final decisions.
Rule 403 establishes that relevant evidence can be excluded if its
probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial effect. This balancing
test is strongly weighted toward admission of evidence, and it is often
difficult to establish "unfair prejudice"-technically, all relevant evi-
dence is prejudiced toward one side or the other, and defining the line
of "unfair" can be an impossible task. Generally, counsel tends to avoid
using Rule 403 as a basis for objecting to evidence, in part because
doing so indicates a stipulation that the evidence is, in fact, relevant.
Section IV of the FRE also allows exclusion for evidence that
wastes time, is misleading, is hearsay, is character-based, and is privi-
leged.65 Of course, each of these areas have exceptions upon excep-
tions, and none can be as clearly defined as would be ideal. But again,
the overall objective is to allow the jury to hear as much of the evi-
dence as possible, so each of these options can be difficult to establish.
The Exclusionary Rule, a court-created, constitutionally based
remedy and deterrent to unreasonable or unfair conduct by the police,
covers three areas: evidence gained from unreasonable search and
seizure,66 improperly solicited self-incriminating statements67, and
evidenced obtained through a violation of the defendant's right to
counsel.68 Any evidence discovered through these methods, or as a
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id,
64. Id.
65. See generally FED. R. EVID. 401-415.
66. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Mapp v. Ohio 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
67. U.S. CONST. amend. V; Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
68. Id.
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result of these methods (fruit of the poisonous tree), can and should be
excluded at trial.69 Courts will refuse to apply the rule, however, if the
cost of exclusion outweighs the deterrent or remedial benefits.70
The objectives of the FRE and the Exclusionary Rule are sound-
to only allow evidence at trial that is relevant and fair. Still, as will be
illustrated below, these rules can be misconstrued and misused, even
abused, to the point of corrupting the narrative possibilities available
to the jury. Further, the appeals courts have historically rubber-
stamped the decisions of trial courts in these areas, also utilizing the
harmless error doctrine described above, so many of the years-old
exoneration cases reflect questionable evidentiary rulings that clearly
modified the narrative options for juries to consider.
More recently, and likely because of the media exposure sur-
rounding exonerations over the past decade, appeals courts seem to be
looking more closely at these types of issues, thus compelling trial
court judges to be more conscientious in making admissibility deci-
sions. Unfortunately, for those cases already past the direct appeal
stage, admissibility issues are procedurally barred from consideration
unless the petitioner can make a solid case, usually through an accu-
mulation of bad evidentiary decisions, for due process violations.71
III. EFFECT OF EVIDENTIARY ERRORS ON JURY DECISION-MAKING
The sheer volume of laws, rules, and exceptions surrounding evi-
dentiary issues indicates recognition of the importance of presenting a
fair and complete set of facts for the jury to consider. However, as the
following examples demonstrate, there is sometimes a clear disconnect
between the spirit of the law and the realities of wrongful verdicts. The
first example involves a surprisingly common situation-a wrongful
conviction based almost entirely on Brady-related issues. The second
example is based on the experience of a frustrated juror in a South
Carolina murder case, demonstrating both the impact of missing evi-
dence on the narrative a jury developed and the impact that a later
realization of error can have on a juror who was just trying to do the
right thing.
69. See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) (developed the
"fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, though the term was first coined by Justice Frankfurter in
Nardone v United States, 308 US 338, 341 (1939)).
70. Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998).
71. Ward v. Jenkins, 613 F.3d 692 (7th Cir. 2010).
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A. Armstrong's "Harmless Error" Brady Issues
How do Brady and other evidentiary issues impact juror decision-
making? Unfortunately, probably more than judges and prosecutors
want to acknowledge. The obvious problem is that in some wrongful
conviction cases the jury was served an incomplete or misleading set
of facts and expected to essentially play "choose your own adven-
ture"-filling in the holes in the narrative with their own knowledge,
experiences, and biases.
A recent exoneration litigated by the Duke Wrongful Convictions
Clinic (Duke Clinic) presents an interesting story of a case predicated
on just these types of issues. LaMonte Armstrong was convicted of
first-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison in August 1995.72
The crime charged was the July 1988 murder of Ms. Ernestine Comp-
ton, a faculty member at North Carolina A&T University and a neighbor
of Mr. Armstrong's family. Mr. Armstrong emerged as a suspect as a
result of a CrimeStoppers call made by a distant acquaintance of Arm-
strong, Mr. Charles Blackwell. The police soon interviewed Armstrong
by phone, then three months later in person, during which he men-
tioned that he had received a few phone calls from Mr. Blackwell ask-
ing Mr. Armstrong for information about the case. Mr. Armstrong
denied any knowledge of the murder, both to the police in the inter-
views and to Mr. Blackwell during these odd phone calls. Post-
conviction investigation would later reveal that the investigating offic-
ers, in fact, orchestrated the phone calls, as well as a recorded drop-in
visit from Mr. Blackwell.
For the next six years, no further interaction occurred between
the police and Mr. Armstrong regarding the Compton murder. Howev-
er, in 1994, the police took an inexplicably renewed interest in the
case, and the lead detective and the then-assistant district attorney
decided to file charges against Mr. Blackwell as "a participant" in Ms.
Compton's murder based on information he fabricated or otherwise
gleaned through his repeated contacts with the investigating officers.
With no apparent physical evidence at hand, Mr. Blackwell was
plucked from prison in Person County, returned to Greensboro, and
charged with the murder of Ms. Compton in March of 1994. In April,
72. The details of the Lamonte Armstrong case that follow are accumulated from the case
files, Motion for Appropriate Relief, or MAR petitions, and other documentation related to the
Duke Wrongful Convictions Clinic's work in litigating Mr. Armstrong's exoneration. Thus, we
included no additional citations through the case synopsis.
[Vol190:3
PRE- TRIAL ERRORS
Mr. Armstrong was arrested and charged as well, presumably because
of Mr. Blackwell's statements. Mr. Blackwell eventually pled guilty to
accessory to murder and agreed to a five-year sentence. Mr. Armstrong
consistently denied involvement in the crime, refused two plea offers
from the State (for sentences of twenty and fifteen years), and was
subsequently tried, convicted, and sentenced to life in 1996.
With the absence of any physical evidence connecting either de-
fendant to this crime, the State's case rested on creating a narrative
through witness testimony. The prosecution's theory was that Mr.
Armstrong, who had known the victim for many years, was in the habit
of borrowing money from her and when she refused to give him money
on this occasion, Mr. Armstrong became enraged and murdered her.
The key witnesses included Mr. Blackwell and three other incentivized
witnesses, including two jail inmates, all of whom received some fa-
vorable treatment in exchange for their testimony. Of course, the jury
heard Mr. Blackwell testify that he had pled guilty to playing a role in
the murder and was present at the scene with Mr. Armstrong right up
until the murder occurred. One witness testified to seeing Mr. Arm-
strong and Mr. Blackwell leaving the scene. The other two witnesses
testified that Mr. Armstrong confessed to each of them, on separate
occasions while jailed together, that he had committed the murder.
Although there essentially was no other evidence, it was reasonable,
given the available data and a fairly simple storyline, that the jury
could easily develop a rational narrative leading to a guilty verdict.
Unfortunately for those jurors, they were denied access to signifi-
cant evidence ranging from the basic facts of the case to the trouble-
some realities surrounding each of the key witnesses. Brady violations
included nondisclosure of witness statements that established a differ-
ent time frame for the murder-one that inconveniently coincided
with a solid alibi for Mr. Armstrong. Additionally, the state withheld
evidence that directly contradicted the prosecution's theory of the
case. The victim actually did lend money to the young men in her
neighborhood on occasion, and she kept records of those loans on her
refrigerator. However, Mr. Armstrong's name was not on any of these
lists, and there was no evidence he had ever borrowed money from
her.
Also, the state failed to disclose the entirety of the detectives' rela-
tionship with Mr. Blackwell, including evidence that his story changed
significantly over a number of interviews and included innumerable
inaccuracies; that he was paid cash on multiple occasions to obtain
2015]
CHICAGO-KENT LA W REVIEW
incriminating statements from Mr. Armstrong; that recordings of Mr.
Armstrong's repeated and consistent denials existed; and that Mr.
Blackwell, as well as the other three informants, were provided other
incentives for their testimony. Furthermore, each of the three jailhouse
informants, including the one who claimed to witness Mr. Armstrong
and Mr. Blackwell at the scene, were first in contact with the police
regarding this case more than five years after the crime, and only after
the police had set their sights on Mr. Armstrong. Additionally, the po-
lice denied the existence of alternative suspects at trial, though the
Duke Clinic's review of their files indicated otherwise.
Perhaps it is fair to say that any of these issues, individually, could
be considered "harmless" in terms of deciding Mr. Armstrong's guilt
and each was, in fact, denied on direct appeal on that basis. However, it
is disingenuous to assume that none of the twelve jurors would have
viewed this case differently, and would have developed a different
narrative, given any or all of this additional evidence. Taken from the
jurors' perspectives, there is little question that Mr. Blackwell's plea
deal and admission of involvement in the crime provided him other-
wise unwarranted credibility. Still, had the jurors heard the totality of
the background of the case it seems possible, if not likely, that they
would have at least developed a different and more accurate narrative,
if not a different verdict.
Ironically, Armstrong's case was not resolved on the basis of any
of the evidentiary issues discussed above. The Duke Clinic managed to
encourage cooperation from the current police department and district
attorney, and, in 2012, they reran prints found at the scene. In a stroke
of unbelievable luck, the actual perpetrator's prints had been entered
into the system just a few weeks before, and thus, after languishing as
an "unknown" palm print over the murdered Ms. Compton's body for
years, the mystery was solved. The State agreed to release Mr. Arm-
strong.
Unfortunately, as in other exonerations, the evidentiary issues did
not make the front page, or the pages of precedent. Although the Arm-
strong case is a remarkable example of justice gone awry, the reality is
that an argument can be made that the jury still did its job. Given an
"admitted" co-conspirator as a key witness, multiple "confession" wit-
nesses, a plausible if unproven motive, and little else to go on, the ju-
rors had little choice but to develop a narrative that encompassed all
those details. That, combined with a natural bias toward the prosecu-
tor's position resulted in a supportable, if entirely incorrect, verdict.
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While Mr. Armstrong's case is a particularly egregious example of
how Brady and Napue-related issues can produce devastating results,
it is in no way an isolated situation. The Duke Clinic,73 now in its fifth
year of operation, has pursued exonerations for a total of twelve inno-
cent petitioners. Of those, five have resulted in exonerations while the
remaining seven continue to wend their way through the system. All
except three have included one or more Brady-progeny claims.74 Those
nine cases exemplify the reality that the presentation of false and mis-
leading evidence, and the absence of critical exculpatory and relevant
evidence, play a significant role in convicting the innocent.75
A number of the Brady-related claims in the Duke Clinic cases in-
volve coercion or inducement of key witnesses, often resulting in com-
pletely falsified testimony at trial.76 Others relate to blatant
withholding of evidence that fails to fit with the narrative the prosecu-
tion wants to assert; still others represent post-conviction discovery of
false testimony by the police officers involved in the case. Several of
the filed-but-not-resolved cases rely on Brady-related issues for more
than one-half of the claims asserted.77 Of course, it can easily be argued
that merely raising a Brady claim does not establish an actual Brady
violation, especially since none have been accepted within the courts.
However, certainly the sheer volume of Brady issues uncovered by the
Duke Clinic investigations raises a red flag of concern about the effica-
cy of the power of Brady and its progeny.
The five exonerations have some interesting similarities: none in-
volved DNA evidence,78 neither at trial nor in post-conviction relief,
73. The Duke Clinic is organized under the Duke Center for Criminal Justice and Professional
Responsibility, which has also recently launched a research division to track and examine the root
causes of wrongful conviction. The statistics and generalizations referred to here are based on
both clinic-driven exonerations and court outcomes of other cases currently in litigation.
74. The three Duke Clinic cases without Brady-type claims are special cases. The first is one
in which a non-English speaking defendant pled guilty on the advice of counsel, thus his entire
claim is based on ineffective assistance of counsel. By pleading guilty, the defendant avoided a
trial, which undoubtedly would have raised many of these same issues. The second case also
relied on ineffective assistance of counsel claims, as well as a victim recantation. The third peti-
tioner was released in cooperation with the District Attorney without a Motion for Appropriate
Relief (innocence petition), though there were clear Brady-related issues in that trial as well.
75. In total, the Clinic has put forth twenty-nine Brady-related claims in the filed MARs of
sixty-one individual claims asserted. Of the nine cases that do include evidentiary issues like
these, they comprise more than fifty percent of the issues raised.
76. The generalizations and statistics here are based on the most recent review of all Duke
Clinic cases, both resolved and in litigation.
77. Other common claims include ineffective assistance of counsel, new evidence, and Con-
stitution-based claims of due process violations.
78. It is important to note that post-conviction relief without the benefit of DNA or other
new physical evidence to establish innocence must rely on constitutional claims to open the door
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and all were resolved with the cooperation of the current district at-
torneys and other investigative personnel in the jurisdiction of the
original conviction. Because of this cooperative effort, none of the con-
victions have been vacated on the basis of Brady or Giglio, or any other
specific claims for that matter. While the process at work here demon-
strates a positive reflection of some jurisdictions' willingness to right
past wrongs, it also means that no case law has been established from
these cases that reflect the "harmful" effects of misleading, false, or
absent evidence on the original verdicts.
More profoundly, the narratives developed in each of the twelve
trials considered above barely resemble the narratives developed
through post-conviction investigation. As important information is
uncovered, the gaps are filled and the distortions are corrected, and
the resultant story is often barely recognizable against the original
impressions of the trial transcript. Clearly, at least in these cases of
established innocence, it is unfair to expect any jury to play the role of
gatekeeper in protecting the innocent.
B. J. L. Hardee's Jury Experience with Admissibility Issues
Admissibility issues also arise in a significant proportion of exon-
eration cases, but they are less visible than Brady and Napue issues.
Admissibility issues are generally dealt with prior to trial, with mo-
tions presented and judicial decisions rendered outside of the jury's
presence. Of course, the results of these motions, right or wrong, will
alter the narrative developed by a jury, whatever the righteous or de-
vious intentions of counsel and the judge. Furthermore, because these
issues are typically addressed and dismissed on direct appeal (again,
typically under the harmless error doctrine), they are not available as
strong arguments in innocence petitions unless the cumulative effect of
these errors can show a due process violation. As the following exam-
ple indicates, questionable outcomes in this area can create potentially
disastrous results, both for the defendant and for the individual juror.
A 2012 autobiographical book by J. L. Hardee, justice or Injustice,
recounts the author's experience as a young juror in a 1999 capital
to a new trial. In the best cases, the investigation results behind those constitutional claims also
establish clear innocence, and the state will either agree to the exoneration or at least refuse to
retry the released defendant.
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case in South Carolina.79 Mr. Hardee's experience was devastating to
his psyche, and even more so to the defendant, who might not have
been convicted given a different, more accurate selection of evidence
available at trial. While the story is a retrospective account by just one
juror, it does provide anecdotal insight about one jury's construction of
a narrative leading to conviction of a potentially innocent defendant.
Winston-Salem resident Kimberley Renee Poole was charged with
murder and conspiracy for the shooting death of her husband on a
South Carolina beach late one summer night. According to trial testi-
mony, Ms. Poole and her husband had some marital issues. She had
worked as a stripper, at her husband's insistence, and they had fre-
quently included other women in their sex life. Ms. Poole began an
affair with John Boyd Frasier, a customer at her strip club, and at one
point left her husband to move in with Mr. Frasier. However, when her
husband threatened to divorce Ms. Poole and take full custody of their
daughter, Ms. Poole broke up with Mr. Frasier and returned to the fam-
ily home. A few months later, Ms. Poole planned a weekend getaway to
Myrtle Beach with her husband to celebrate their three-year anniver-
sary. Late one night, after having marital relations on the beach, a
masked man approached and shot Mr. Poole to death.
The investigation turned immediately to Ms. Poole, as would be
expected, and was exacerbated by a call from Mr. Poole's family accus-
ing Ms. Poole and her ex-boyfriend of the murder. Very early in the
morning following the murder, Winston-Salem police were dispatched
to the ex-boyfriend's home for an interview. The police reported that
Mr. Frasier appeared to have been asleep when they arrived, and his
vehicle's hood was cool to the touch, indicating it had not been driven
recently. The drive between Myrtle Beach, where the crime occurred
between 11:00 p.m. and midnight, and Winston-Salem, where Mr. Fra-
sier was interviewed at around 5:00 a.m., is at least a four-hour trip.
There was no physical evidence to rely on, but one middle-aged couple
claimed to identify Mr. Frasier as someone they saw on the beach, in
the dark, on the night of the murder.
Immediately following the crime, the Myrtle Beach police inter-
viewed Ms. Poole for seventeen hours straight. While she requested an
attorney, her relatives summoned the family attorney, who was not, in
fact, a criminal attorney. He was scheduled to leave for a European
79. J. L. HARDEE, JUSTICE OR INJUSTICE? WHAT REALLY HAPPENS IN A JURY ROOM (2012). The synop-
sis of the Poole case that follows is derived primarily from Mr. Hardee's autobiographical account,
and thus citations for each line would be repetitive and unwieldy.
2015]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
vacation the following day, and pushed the interview along by essen-
tially grilling his own client for the police. He repeatedly insisted that
Ms. Poole needed to tell the police what they wanted to know and even
questioned her himself. After seventeen hours of denials, the police
threatened to have Ms. Poole's daughter removed from her custody,
and she finally "admitted" that she might have told the ex-boyfriend
that she and her husband were going to Myrtle Beach for the weekend.
At trial, the police claimed that Ms. Poole was not a suspect until she
actually confessed, seventeen hours into the interrogation. In addition
to the confession, the state presented the two "eyewitnesses" who tes-
tified with baffling certainty that they saw Mr. Frasier on the beach
earlier that night.
Mr. Hardee writes primarily about his own experience in the jury
room. The first vote was split, six guilty, four not guilty, and two guilty
only on the conspiracy charge. The deliberations, as Mr. Hardee de-
scribes them, essentially revolved around the confession and its legit-
imacy. It was clear to a number of jurors that both detectives were
deceitful in their testimony regarding when and whether Ms. Poole
was considered a suspect, and compounded by the circumstances of
the interrogation, several jurors doubted the validity of the confession.
Others, including the strong-willed (and possibly biased) forewoman,
were convinced that the confession was the final word, and refused to
consider the light weight of the other evidence.
The confession, even if believed, was not sufficient to warrant
conviction alone, because Ms. Poole merely admitted that she "may
have" told the ex-boyfriend about the vacation to Myrtle Beach; there
was no admission of conspiracy to murder her husband. Mr. Hardee
reflects on the differences among his and other jurors' understanding
of the confession evidence. Because both he and his wife had been
adulterous early in the marriage, he had a very different perspective on
if and why Ms. Poole might have mentioned the trip to the ex-
boyfriend. He presumed that she would have told the boyfriend about
the trip, primarily to ensure that he would not be tempted to call or
check in during that time. Other jurors, who seemed to have strong
negative feelings toward adulterers as a class, were convinced that Ms.
Poole's actions were wholly nefarious, and that the only purpose in
telling the ex about the trip would be to conspire to murder the hus-
band.
The jury members twice sent a message to the judge attesting to
the hung jury, and twice were ordered to continue deliberating. Ac-
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cording to Mr. Hardee's recollection of events, the forewoman harassed
and intimidated the "not guilty" voters until, one by one, they changed
their votes to "guilty", leaving Mr. Hardee as the lone "not guilty" hold-
out. After nine hours of deliberations with no breaks allowed by the
judge, Mr. Hardee, in desperate need of a cigarette, also capitulated and
agreed to a guilty verdict. He immediately regretted his decision. His
distress was obvious enough that he was called into chambers by the
judge immediately following the reading of the verdict. Mr. Hardee
voiced his concerns, but the judge essentially patted Mr. Hardee on the
back and told him he had done the right thing.
The following day, Mr. Hardee called and met with Ms. Poole's de-
fense attorney, filling him in on the details of the deliberations and his
remorse over going along with the verdict. The defense counsel in-
formed Mr. Hardee that not only should the "confession" not have been
allowed, but that several important facts were unfairly excluded. Ap-
parently, there had been a viable third-party suspect to the shooting
that was kept from the jury because the poor investigation "painted the
Myrtle Beach police in a bad light." Also, there was an email message
from Mr. Frasier to a friend a few days before the crime, in which he
grumbled that Ms. Poole refused to communicate with him anymore,
meaning she could not have been an active conspirator, even if Mr.
Frasier was actually the perpetrator.
The interesting point that this new information highlights is that,
in this case, all of the narratives developed by the jurors were arguably
inaccurate. The "guilty" voters presumed that, because Ms. Poole was
established as an adulterer, it followed that she was also a conspirator
with the boyfriend in the murder of her husband. For Mr. Hardee, and
perhaps other jurors with relevant life experience, the presumption
was that Ms. Poole might well have articulated her weekend plans to
the boyfriend, but with the intention of protecting her marriage rather
than for more malicious reasons.
While these two versions of the narrative clearly result in oppo-
site verdicts (at least on the conspiracy charge), the irony is that nei-
ther of these stories are factually accurate. As Mr. Hardee discovered
after the verdict, there was strong evidence that Ms. Poole had not, in
fact, communicated with the ex-boyfriend at all in the weeks leading up
to the murder. Therefore, not only did jurors create different narra-
tives to explain the circumstances, each of those versions were factual-
ly incorrect. Certainly, this result is not the intended consequence of
our justice system's evidentiary procedures and, ultimately, it is a dis-
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credit to the justice system for fixable issues such as missing, mislead-
ing or false evidence to result in a verdict based on an entirely false
narrative of the case.
Later, another jury convicted Mr. Frasier of murder on similarly
weak evidence. That conviction was overturned on direct appeal on
evidentiary issues; he was retried, and was found guilty again. Alt-
hough errors were again identified in his second trial, his direct appeal
was denied upon a finding of harmless error. Recently, the Wake For-
est Law School's Innocence and justice Clinic evaluated Mr. Frasier's
claims of innocence, and it is now in the hands of a South Carolina-
based clinic. Ms. Poole, after losing her direct appeal, fired her counsel
and is currently searching for a new pro bono defense team. It is likely
that a number of Brady, Giglio, and other evidentiary issues, including
those noted here, will be addressed in each of their innocence peti-
tions.
The evidentiary issues here are simple and clear, yet reflect the
serious conundrum placed on jurors who are not provided the whole
story. Research has established that the jury's behavior here was ex-
pected-people are extremely swayed by the existence of a confession,
no matter how weak, contrived, or unjust the circumstances surround-
ing the admission.80 Hence, the reason for the Exclusionary Rule and
the safeguards against unreasonable behavior-coercion, unfair pres-
sure, Miranda-on the part of the police. Clearly, Ms. Poole's confes-
sion, such as it was, should have been a ripe candidate for the
Exclusionary Rule. By allowing a clearly questionable and incomplete
confession to be presented as the primary evidence, without any cor-
roborating facts, the jurors were forced to depend and rely on it as
unrealistically valid.
The two critical facts left out of the Poole trial, the alternative sus-
pect and Mr. Frasier's unprovoked admission of having no communica-
tion with Ms. Poole, absolutely seem relevant in light of the entire
narrative developed by the jury, though the judge opted to disallow
both items of evidence as irrelevant. If nothing else, those jurors lean-
ing toward acquittal were deprived of available evidence to support
their position. Ostensibly, this wrong should have been righted on di-
rect appeal. At the time however, appeals courts were generally in the
habit of rubber stamping the trial courts' work, and these clear viola-
tions of evidentiary standards slipped through.
80. HARRY KALVEN & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966).
[Vol 90:3
PRE-TRIAL ERRORS
Mr. Hardee's short but insightful account of his experience as a ju-
ror on a capital trial reveals a tremendous number of issues and com-
plications within the jury system, from the lack of understanding of
their rights and responsibilities, to the pressures applied by the system
to compromise their opinions. In fact, the issue of evidence in and evi-
dence out is a relatively minor one in Mr. Hardee's story. Still, it is not
difficult to see that this case, its defendant, and at least some of the
jurors, did suffer because of the admissibility issues of key evidence
and its impact on their ability to develop an accurate narrative of the
case.
V. THE BOTTOM LINE
The realization of how often the types of evidentiary issues may
arise in the growing number of exonerations raises a number of deeper
questions about how jurors interpret and assimilate the information
they are and are not provided, and it suggests the reality that many
erroneous verdicts likely spring from the development of false narra-
tives. Closer investigation of these issues may well lead to policy and
procedure changes to curb the incidence of wrongful convictions.
As noted above, the appellate courts have shown a tendency to
dismiss both Brady and admissibility issues as "harmless" relative to
the ultimate verdicts. From a policy standpoint, the apparent issue is
that accountability related to Brady-type violations is essentially non-
existent. Clearly, more work must be done to establish the insidious
nature of withheld, misleading and false evidence on faulty verdicts. As
the rapidly growing assemblage of exonerations reflects, these issues
may have far greater impact on jurors' decision-making than currently
acknowledged. Without question, the allowance of absent, misleading,
or false evidence must influence the narrative the jury develops, and
the final verdict absolutely springs from that narrative. In order to
reduce erroneous convictions, these evidentiary problems and their
consequences must be analyzed and addressed.
As of this writing, the National Registry of Exonerations contains
over 1,560 cases of exonerations throughout the United States.81 Of
those, the vast majority of defendants were convicted by a jury.82 The
81. NAT'L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, A PROJECT OF THE U. OF MICH. L. SCH., supra note 29.
82. However, a record 17% of those cases added this past year were convictions through
plea bargains, raising the total to 152 of 1433 exonerations Oust over 10%) that were initially
disposed through guilty pleas.
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top six contributing errors (many cases feature more than one of the
following) include: perjury or false accusation (55%, typically inform-
ants or snitches, often incentivized); official misconduct (46%, from
Brady violations to misleading questions or statements regarding fo-
rensic evidence); mistaken witness identification (over 34% of cases);
false or misleading forensic evidence; false confessions (a shocking
13% of known exonerations); and inadequate defense counsel.83
The weight of responsibility of the jury in these cases is unclear,
although it is very likely to be negligible. As considered above, juries in
general do a very respectable job of dealing with the evidence as it is
presented, and tend to want to do the right thing. However, when the
evidence presented is false or misleading or simply nonexistent at trial,
the jury cannot be held responsible for creating an erroneous narrative
and thus a wrongful verdict.
Ultimately, it seems clear that, for the overwhelming number of
cases, the jury's primary role in wrongful convictions is one that car-
ries no fault-they are simply doing the best they can given often prej-
udicial evidence and arguments. In short, evidentiary issues at trial are
a very common causal factor in wrongful convictions.
The U.S. Constitution guarantees the right to a fair trial, but not
one free from error, and it is from this notion that the harmless error
doctrine is justified. However, it certainly appears from at least an an-
ecdotal standpoint, that the line between "harmless" and fundamental-
ly unfair might currently be misplaced. It is hoped that the
development of a comprehensive root cause analysis methodology will
elucidate and define the extent of the problem of harmless error and
other doctrines, policies, and procedures, as well as lead to practical
potential solutions that will reduce the incidence of wrongful convic-
tions in the future.
83. NAT'L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, A PROJECT OF THE U. OF MICH. L. ScH., supra note 29.
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